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Douzinas’ book is that kind of work that can bring out manifold emotions. As it ventures 
between outright indictments of the late capitalist system in lieu of the 2008 global economic 
crisis to an identification of rays of optimism for a new way of doing things, these emotions 
appear to be very much conditioned by the time period that one reads this very engaging and 
insightful work.   It’s important to note that Douzinas moves from an exploration of the idea 
of ‘Greece [becoming] the future of Europe’, echoing that way the points raised in an article 
published in The Guardian, which was aptly titled: ‘Is Greece the Eurozone’s Canary in The 
Coalmine?’i, whereby a bleak future with a return to a Dickensian era with minimal 
employment rights is forecasted to a view that sees Greece as having a potential to become 
part of  a ‘future of Europe’ that will ‘join the age of resistance’ (p. 7).  This latter view is a 
development that Douzinas aspires to and that largely conditions the interpretation that he 
offers over certain events.  
That becomes clear in his treatment of the 2011 indignant (Aganaktismenoi) mobilizations in 
central Athens (Syntagma Square) and the astounding electoral rise of the radical left party, 
Syriza. I’m expanding upon these later in the review.  Meanwhile, it’s important to point out 
that, in his admittance, Douzinas wrote the Greek edition of the book under review here, ‘in 
outrage and despair’ (p. 4), whilst in the English edition, written a year later (in 2012), there 
was still evident outrage ‘but there is also hope’ (ibid.).  That hope has been encapsulated in 
what he wrote in the back cover of the Greek edition in relation to the Aganaktismenoi 
mobilizations: ‘The meaning and limits of democracy are renegotiated in the place it was 
born’ (p. 5).  His friends told him at the time that he was ‘excessively optimistic or, even 
worse, [that he] had lost touch with reality’ (ibid.).  Writing this review two years after the 
publication of the English edition, I will support that his friends were right.  In his defence, he 
argues that the ‘long absence from Greece and [his] academic interests and readings mean 
that the sociological and anthropological musings may not be fully informed’ (p. 7).  In the 
following paragraphs I am discussing points missed in his account by using some political 
sociology insights on the Greek case.  Through that, I mainly wish that what I consider to be 
an excellent critical account of the challenges faced by the new international of hope that 
Douzinas wishes to assist would be complemented and perhaps form part of the discussion in 
a future edition of the book.  He has done an outstanding work in structuring this book in a 
way that facilitates the smooth passage from on theme to another whilst simultaneously 
allowing the reader to select individual chapter and/or section without missing the essence of 
the overall argument.      
Starting the review process, I believe that it’s important to highlight the fact that Costas 
Douzinas is, as he reveals in the prologue of the book, a Greek expatriate who arrived in 
London in July 1974, right after the fall of the Greek dictatorship.   His experience in his new 
home was generally positive with people generally expressing very positive views for 
Greece, be it because of their admiration for the legacy of the ancients or because they had a 
very enjoyable time in sunny Greece.  He found that this attitude was completely reversed in 
2010 when ‘a different cold and hostile Britain emerged.  Newspapers and broadcasts kept 
talking about the cheating corrupt lazy Greeks, a nation I [he] did not recognize.  Every 
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aspect had failed, every Greek was immoral.  The debt and deficit had metamorphosed a 
whole people overnight.  For the first time, I felt a “racism-lite” affecting me.  It was 
ideological not ethnic” (p. 2).   
As a Greek expatriate, living in Northern Ireland, I also experienced similar hostile attitudes 
towards the Greeks around the same period. However, when confronted by these attitudes, I 
always adopted a posture that was effectively disarming them or reducing their impact.  I 
presume that this very effective defence mechanism was to an extent armed by the different 
generational experience that I have as a Greek expatriate in the British Isles to that of Costas 
Douzinas. I was born in 1975, during the democratic transition period in Greece, when Costas 
Douzinas had completed his first year in the UK.  As a boy I became aware of the electoral 
victory of PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) in the early 1980s and what the notion 
of change/allaghi/ that was employed by its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, meant 
to many people, including my mother and many other women who realised their 
emancipation in the equality between the sexes message that was promoted in the discourse 
of allaghi.  By 1985 it had become apparent that many of the promises of allaghi were just 
blatant populism and by 1989, the dirty/vromiko 1989 as it known in popular memory, the 
unblemished image of the party and its leader was tarnished by a range of economic scandals 
that led to legal proceedings against prominent PASOK cadres.  
To cut a long story short, after an interlude taken by successive two-party, all-party coalition 
governments, and a government by the conservative opposition (New Democracy, ND), 
PASOK returned to power in 1993.  During the ND administration, Greece experienced, for 
the first time after the democratic transition, intensive protest and school occupations by high 
school pupils.  As Douzinas claims that the December 2008 riots or insurrection, as he 
prefers, were essential as a ‘propaideutic for the resistances of 2010 and 2011’ (p. 143), I 
would say that the various expressions of school pupils’ contestation linked to the 2008 
insurrection would not have happened without the precedent of the events linked the school 
pupils’ mobilizations of 1990/91.ii  Similarly to the youth 2008, the youngsters of 1990/91 
were also described as apolitical louts, “the coca cola generation”, and their experimentation 
with the horizontal organisation and decision-making was downplayed. Going back to the 
discussion of my defensive mechanism when confronted by hostile remarks, I’m continuing 
with my personal experience.        
When I arrived in England for my university studies in 1994, I found that the dirty 1989 was 
still alive in the mind of at least my academic instructors in political science who were 
bringing in the occasional humorous comment about the state of the Greek economy and the 
contribution of the Greeks in the European family.  1989 had definitely made an impact that 
for the “Greeks are a nation of waiters and have nothing to do with the ancients” sectors was 
nothing but a ratification of their pre-established views and stereotypes for the Greeks and 
perhaps other southern Europeans.  I guess that the events of 2010 brought again hostile 
comments from the same sectors who usually exhibit so much naivety and ignorance on the 
politico-economic operations of their own countries that it’s not really worth engaging with 
them.  For those sectors though with a genuine interest to appraise the situation away from 
prevalent stereotypes, the aforementioned defence mechanism was using the precedent of 
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1989.  My argument had as follows: If all these negatives (widespread corruption in the 
public sector, nepotism, clientelist relations, tax evasion) were known to me since I was 14 
(in 1989), surely these must have also been known by, at least, the intelligence services of the 
UK.  If they weren’t, then I personally should have been really worried about the state of the 
intelligence that informs UK policy-makers.  The answer is clear, of course they knew and so 
did the policy-makers of France, Germany and of any other country having trade agreements 
with Greece.  These countries were happy to take advantage of these exotic peculiarities of 
the Greek social, which have been identified and discussed in numerous sociological and 
anthropological studies of Mediterranean societies (p. 58), to sell their produce, be it new 
technological implements to modernise public utilities, chemicals improving agricultural 
production or military equipment in what is one of the most heavily militarised places in 
Europe. 
In addition, as successive governments since 1989 had proclaimed their intention to tackle the 
perennial Greek problems but continuously failed, it was only a natural progression for the 
average Greek to accept them as the norm and act accordingly.  After all, this is the accepted 
behaviour of the rational decision maker in the market economy.  The overall rational of the 
average Greek, voters of the two major parties that have alternated in government in Greece 
since the democratic transition, most likely had as follows: They (Europe) know what’s going 
on, they are not saints anyway (see p. 59) and they are happy as long as we buy their products 
(see above), we know what’s going on and we are not communists (whose ideology has 
failed) anyway.  It was in this context where illegality had become the accepted norm and 
whoever was against it was simply an eccentric.  Still, there was a minority, which was not 
willing to take this progression of events as a fait accompli, albeit not necessarily for the 
same reasons.   
For instance, it may be the case that when the Aganaktismenoi crowd at the upper section of 
Syntagma Square were venting the indignation to the politicians that they elected to represent 
them in the Greek parliament by rhythmically shouting “thieves, thieves” or “burn, burn, 
brothel of a parliament burn” and gesturing with moutzasiii towards the parliament, one 
would have thought that they were not targeting all MPs.  After all the representatives of the 
Greek Communist Party/KKE and Syriza didn’t have any central government positions to 
accrue any blame for issues linked to the cumbersome predicament of the country.  These left 
political forces had been always campaigning against the negativities in the Greek social 
complex as seen, of course, by anti-capitalist lenses.   For most of the democratic transition 
period they political forces with small electoral leverage with more than 80% of the Greek 
public, giving its support to PASOK and ND.  For that reason, it’s possible to assume that 
when the Aganaktismenoi were venturing their anger towards the 300 MPs had, in fact, had 
the representatives of the two dominant parties in mind.    Nevertheless, that was never 
clarified and the devaluation of the democratic political system in its entirety was promoted 
instead.  That was a development that suited very well some characters with shaved heads 
that were zieg heiling in every opportunity and most definitely had little respect for 
parliamentary democracy anyway.  That group mingled with the great variety of people, 
ranging from the truly disaffected by a continuous wave of austerity cuts to many youngsters 
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who were joining in for the fun, which was assembling at the time upper section of Syntagma 
square and perhaps played a key role in initiating the most abusive shouting towards the 
parliament. 
With Douzinas using the concept of multitude as a way of marking the spirit that the stasis, 
the term that he cleverly labels the Aganaktismenoi protest, at Syntagma will be remembered 
by, it immediately becomes apparent that he is influenced by what he witnessed at the lower 
part of Syntagma Square.  That sector of stasis Syntagma was occupied by committed left 
activists who found an opportunity to experiment with the immediate democratic procedures 
that they envisage for the eutopia that they aspire to.    
            
          
                                                          
i Wachman, R. (2010) ‘Is Greece the Eurozone’s Canary in the Coalmine?’ The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/01/greek-crisis-threatens-eurozone, date accessed 15 May 2010 
ii See Karamichas, J. (2009). ‘The December 2008 Riots in Greece’ Social Movement Studies, 8/3, pp. 289-293.   
 
iii Moutza is a traditional gesture of insult among Greeks.   
